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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge: 
 
After receiving a tip from an infor mant, two officers 
stopped Larry Valentine on a city str eet late at night and 
discovered a gun. The gun was subsequently suppressed, 
however, when the government pr osecuted Valentine for 
being a felon in possession of a firear m in violation of 18 
U.S.C. S 922(g)(1) and (2). 
 
In suppressing the gun, the District Court r easoned that 
under Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 120 S.Ct. 1375 (2000) 
the informant's tip about Valentine and the surrounding 
circumstances did not provide reasonable suspicion that 
Valentine was engaged in crime. The District Court also 
concluded that Valentine's actions after the officers ordered 
him to stop should not be considered, notwithstanding the 
Supreme Court's analysis of seizures under the Fourth 
Amendment in California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 111 
S.Ct. 1547 (1991). 
 
We will reverse. We hold that the officers had reasonable 
suspicion before ordering Valentine to stop. This case is 
distinguishable from J.L. and our r ecent decision in United 
States v. Ubiles, 224 F.3d 213 (3d Cir . 2000). We also 
conclude that the District Court erred in interpreting 
Hodari D. Valentine's acts after the officers ordered him to 
stop should have been considered. 
 
I 
 
Around 1:00 a.m. on May 8, 1999, Officers W oodard and 
Contreras were patrolling near the intersection of Columbia 
and 18th Avenues in Irvington, New Jersey, an area that 
the officers described in uncontradicted testimony as "very 
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bad" with "[a] lot of shootings." App. at 63. As the officers 
approached the intersection, a young black man in his 
early twenties flagged them down and explained that he 
had just seen a man with a gun. 
 
The informant said that the gunman was wearing a blue 
sweat top, blue pants, and a gold chain around his neck. 
He added that the suspect was dark skinned, had a beard, 
and was accompanied by a young man. When asked to 
identify himself, the informant refused, a response that 
Officer Woodard testified is common, and one that is 
understandable if the informant feared r etribution from the 
armed man or entanglement with the police. The officers 
did not question the informant further and immediately 
went in search of the gunman. 
 
About 50 to 100 feet north of the intersection wher e the 
officers had met the informant, Woodard and Contreras saw 
three men standing in a well-lit parking lot near a chicken 
restaurant. One of the men matched the infor mant's 
description of the armed suspect given moments ago, and 
another was a young male in his twenties, also as the 
informant described. The third was an older man who 
appeared to be in his sixties. 
 
The officers, who were in uniform and in a marked car, 
stopped and stepped out of their vehicle. The thr ee men in 
the parking lot reacted by walking away, northwards. 
Contreras ordered the young male with Valentine to stop, 
and he obeyed, putting his hands up and walking toward 
the squad car. But when Woodar d told Valentine, who was 
about ten feet away, to come over and place his hands on 
the car, Valentine responded,"Who, me?" and charged 
southwards toward Woodard. As Valentine ran, trying to 
push aside Woodard's outstretched arms, the officer 
grabbed his shirt and wrestled him to the gr ound. During 
the scuffle, Woodard heard a ting as Valentine's silver, fully- 
loaded handgun hit the ground. Neither officer had seen the 
gun before that moment. 
 
We have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. S 3731, and 
conduct plenary review of the District Court's determination 
of whether the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop 
and frisk Valentine. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 
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116 S.Ct. 1657 (1996); United States v. Riddick , 156 F.3d 
505, 509 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 
II 
 
Under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968) 
and subsequent cases, "an officer may, consistent with the 
Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop 
when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion 
that criminal activity is afoot." Illinois v. Wardlaw, 528 U.S. 
119, ___, 120 S.Ct. 673, 675 (2000). Reasonable suspicion 
is "a less demanding standard than pr obable cause and 
requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of 
the evidence." 528 U.S. at ___, 120 S.Ct. at 675-76. 
Elaborating on this point, the Supreme Court has said, 
"Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standar d than 
probable cause not only in the sense that r easonable 
suspicion can be established with information that is 
different in quantity or content than that required to 
establish probable cause, but also in the sense that 
reasonable suspicion can arise from infor mation that is less 
reliable than that required to show probable cause." 
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2416 
(1990). The question we must address is whether Officers 
Woodard and Contreras had the "minimal level of objective 
justification" necessary for a Terry  stop. United States v. 
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585 (1989). And 
in evaluating reasonable suspicion, "we must consider `the 
totality of the circumstances--the whole picture.' " Sokolow, 
490 U.S. at 8, 109 S.Ct. at 1585 (quoting United States v. 
Cortez, 499 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 696 (1981)). 
 
We begin our analysis with the Supreme Court's recent 
opinion, J.L., the case that prompted the District Court to 
reconsider its initial denial of Valentine's suppression 
motion. In J.L. the Supreme Court held that police officers 
lacked reasonable suspicion to make a T erry stop when an 
anonymous caller reported that "a young black male 
standing at a particular bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt 
was carrying a gun." Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. at ___, 120 
S.Ct. at 1377. The Supreme Court explained that the 
precise issue before the Court was "whether the tip pointing 
to J.L. had [sufficient] indicia of r eliability." 529 U.S. at ___, 
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120 S.Ct. at 1378. Finding the tip unreliable, the Court did 
not consider under what circumstances a r eliable tip that 
someone was carrying a gun would provide the police with 
reasonable suspicion. Instead, the Court concluded, "All the 
police had to go on in this case was the bar e report of an 
unknown, unaccountable informant who neither explained 
how he knew about the gun nor supplied any basis for 
believing he had inside information about J.L." 529 U.S. at 
___, 120 S.Ct. at 1379. 
 
Discussing the reliability of anonymous tips, the Court 
explained, "Unlike a tip from a known infor mant whose 
reputation can be assessed and who can be held 
responsible if her allegations turn out to be fabricated, see 
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146-147, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 
1923-24 (1972), `an anonymous tip alone seldom 
demonstrates the informant's basis of knowledge or 
veracity.' " J.L., 529 U.S. at ___, 120 S.Ct. at 1378 (quoting 
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. at 329, 110 S.Ct. at 2415). 
Nevertheless, even in the context of probable cause, the 
Court has rejected its earlier, inflexible two-prong test for 
tips set forth in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 
1509 (1964) and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 
S.Ct. 584 (1969). Under Aguilar and Spinelli, the 
government could not rely on a tip unless the government 
could demonstrate both the basis of the infor mant's 
knowledge and the informant's reliability or veracity. The 
Court now uses a flexible standard that assesses the 
relative value and reliability of an infor mant's tip in light of 
the totality of the circumstances. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 
462 U.S. 213, 230-35, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2328-30 (1983); 
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. at 329, 110 S.Ct. at 2415. 
 
The informant's tip in our case is dif ferent from the 
telephone call in J.L. First, unlike J.L., the officers in our 
case knew that the informant was reporting what he had 
observed moments ago, not what he learned fr om stale or 
second-hand sources. At the suppression hearing, Officer 
Woodard was asked, "Did [the infor mant] say how long ago 
that he saw the individual carrying a gun?" W oodard 
replied, "About--maybe a second ago, two seconds ago." 
App. at 68. So the officers could expect that the informant 
had a reasonable basis for his beliefs. The Supreme Court 
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has recognized the greater weight carried by a witness's 
recent report, such as when "the victim of a street crime 
seeks immediate police aid and gives a description of the 
assailant." Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. at 147, 92 S.Ct. at 
1924. 
 
Second, the officers had more reason to believe that the 
informant was credible than the officers did in J.L., for a tip 
given face to face is more reliable than an anonymous 
telephone call. As the Fourth Circuit r ecently explained, 
when an informant relates information to the police face to 
face, the officer has an opportunity to assess the 
informant's credibility and demeanor . United States v. 
Christmas, 222 F.3d 141, 144 (4th Cir . 2000). And when an 
informant gives the police information about a neighbor (as 
in Christmas) or someone nearby (as in our case), the 
informant is exposed to a risk of retaliation from the person 
named, making it less likely that the informant will lie. Id. 
Similarly, as the Fourth Circuit noted, "citizens who 
personally report crimes to the police ther eby make 
themselves accountable for lodging false complaints." Id. 
(citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 233-34, 103 S.Ct. at 
2329-30 (1983); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. at 146-47, 92 
S.Ct. at 1923). 
 
Many cases have recognized the differ ence between in- 
person informants and anonymous telephone calls. See, 
e.g., Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. at ___, 120 S.Ct. at 1381 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) ("If an informant places his 
anonymity at risk, a court can consider this factor in 
weighing the reliability of the tip. An instance where a tip 
might be considered anonymous but nevertheless 
sufficiently reliable to justify a pr oportionate police 
response may be when an unnamed person driving a car 
the police officer later describes stops for a moment and, 
face to face, informs the police that criminal activity is 
occurring."); Davis v. United States, No. 97-CF-1882, 2000 
WL 1358490 (D.C. Sept. 21 2000) (An officer had pr obable 
cause for a search after an informant who declined to give 
his name flagged down the officer and told him that a man 
nearby in a wheelchair was selling crack out of his right 
shoe.); United States v. Salazar, 945 F .2d 47, 50-51 (2d Cir. 
1991) ("[A] face-to-face informant must, as a general 
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matter, be thought more reliable than an anonymous 
telephone tipster, for the former runs the greater risk that 
he may be held accountable if his information proves 
false."); United States v. Sierra-Her nandez, 581 F.2d 760, 
763 (9th Cir. 1978) ("[A]lthough the informant did not 
identify himself by name, he would have been available for 
further questioning if the agent had judged the pr ocedure 
appropriate. Unlike a person who makes an anonymous 
telephone call, this informant confronted the agent 
directly."); United States v. Gorin, 564 F.2d 159, 161 (4th 
Cir. 1977) (per curiam) ("[S]tandar ds of reliability should 
not prevent appropriate action when a victim of a crime 
immediately has contacted the police. That same analysis 
applies [when a witness informs the police in person about 
a crime]."). 
 
Valentine contends that the District Court made a finding 
that the informant left the area after giving the officers the 
tip, and therefore this informant could not have been easily 
held accountable. He also complains that the officers could 
have questioned the informant further. In response to the 
latter objection, we are not going to second-guess the 
officers' decision to pursue the suspect immediately. The 
officers knew the suspect was still in the vicinity, and had 
they stalled for more lengthy questioning of the informant, 
the armed suspect could have escaped detection. 
 
In response to the former objection, we have reviewed the 
record carefully and conclude that the District Court made 
no factual finding about what the informant did. Indeed, 
because no evidence was presented either way on the issue, 
any factual finding that the informant did leave the area 
would have been clearly erroneous. We simply do not know 
what the informant did after the officers left. 
 
What matters for our purposes is not that the officers 
could guarantee that they could track down the infor mant 
again. As the Supreme Court has said in cases like Gates, 
the question is whether the tip should be deemed 
sufficiently trustworthy in light of the total cir cumstances. 
And in this case the circumstances support the reliability of 
the tip: the informant was exposed to r etaliation from 
Valentine and knew that the officers could quickly confirm 
or disconfirm the tip; and the officers could assess the 
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informant's credibility as he spoke, knew what the 
informant looked like, and had some opportunity to find 
the informant if the tip did not pan out. Fr om the fact that 
the officers acted, and acted quickly, after r eceiving the tip, 
a court may deduce that the officers thought the tipster's 
demeanor, voice, and perhaps a host of other factors 
supported the reliability of the tip. Cf. Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 
699, 116 S.Ct. at 1663 ("[A] police officer views the facts 
through the lens of his police experience and expertise. The 
background facts provide a context for the historical facts, 
and when seen together yield inferences that deserve 
deference."). 
 
The reliability of a tip, of course, is not all that we must 
consider in evaluating reasonable suspicion; the content of 
the tip must also be taken into account, as well as other 
surrounding circumstances. If we focus on the content of 
the tip, Valentine can invoke our recent holding that, in 
some contexts, even if police officers have a r eliable tip 
saying that someone is carrying a gun, that infor mation 
alone will not provide enough evidence to support a Terry 
stop. See United States v. Ubiles, 224 F .3d 213 (3d Cir. 
2000). 
 
In Ubiles several officers were overseeing a festival in the 
Virgin Islands when an elderly man appr oached them and 
pointed out a man he had seen in the crowd with a gun. 
We suppressed the gun recover ed from the officers' frisk of 
the suspect, and explained, "For all the officers knew, even 
assuming the reliability of the tip that Ubiles possessed a 
gun, Ubiles was another celebrant lawfully exer cising his 
right under Virgin Island law to possess a gun in public." 
Id. at 218. 
 
We also acknowledged, however, that r easonable 
suspicion does not require that the suspect's acts must 
always be themselves criminal. In many cases the Supreme 
Court has found reasonable suspicion based on acts 
capable of innocent explanation. Most recently, in Wardlaw 
the Court held that headlong flight from the police in a 
high-crime area provides reasonable suspicion, despite the 
fact that flight is not by itself illegal and could have 
completely lawful and rational explanations. The Court 
explained: 
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       Even in Terry, the conduct justifying the stop was 
       ambiguous and susceptible of an innocent explanation. 
       The officer observed two individuals pacing back and 
       forth in front of a store, peering into the window and 
       periodically conferring. Terry, 392 U.S., at 5-6, 88 S.Ct. 
       1868. All of this conduct was by itself lawful, but it 
       also suggested that the individuals were casing the 
       store for a planned robbery. T erry recognized that the 
       officers could detain the individuals to r esolve the 
       ambiguity. Id., at 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868. 
 
Wardlaw, 528 U.S. at ___, 120 S.Ct. at 677. 
 
Despite the obvious danger posed by an armed man in a 
crowd, we concluded in Ubiles that the tip, standing alone, 
did not provide reasonable suspicion because nothing in 
"the defendant's behavior pointed to the pr esence of illegal 
activity." 224 F.3d at 217. In particular , we said that under 
the laws of the Virgin Islands, a citizen could lawfully 
possess a gun during a festival, and there was no reason to 
think Ubiles's gun was unregistered or had an altered serial 
number, the two ways we mentioned that the gun 
possession could have been illegal. 
 
Our case is distinguishable from Ubiles. First, there is 
the broader context. Valentine was walking around at 1:00 
a.m. in a high-crime area known for shootings. While an 
individual's presence in a high-crime ar ea is not by itself 
sufficient to warrant a Terry stop, Wardlaw, 528 U.S. at 
___, 120 S.Ct. at 676 (citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 
99 S.Ct. 2637 (1979)), "the fact that the stop occurred in a 
`high crime area' [is] among the r elevant contextual 
considerations in a Terry analysis." Id. (citing Adams v. 
Williams, 407 U.S. at 144 and 147-48, 92 S.Ct. at 1922 
and 1924). The constellation of likely criminal acts in a 
high-crime area at 1:00 a.m. goes well beyond simply 
carrying a gun without registration or with altered serial 
numbers. Indeed, given the large number of potential 
crimes and the danger posed by an armed criminal, we 
think that if the police officers had done nothing and 
continued on their way after receiving the informant's tip, 
the officers would have been remiss. People who live in 
communities torn by gunfire and violence are entitled to be 
free from fear of victimization and have police investigate 
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before shootings occur. As the Supr eme Court said in 
Wardlaw, when the police lear n of potentially suspicious 
conduct, officers can stop and question the suspects to 
resolve ambiguity about the suspects' conduct. 
 
Moreover, it is well established that officers are allowed to 
ask questions of anyone--and gun owners ar e no exception 
--without having any evidence creating suspicion. Florida v. 
Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 2386 (1991) 
("Since Terry we have held r epeatedly that mere police 
questioning does not constitute a seizure."). Given that the 
original rationale in Terry for per mitting frisks was to 
safeguard officers while they ask questions, see Terry, 392 
U.S. at 23-24, 88 S.Ct. at 1881, a ruling in V alentine's 
favor would produce inexplicable results. We would be 
holding that while diligent officers would have questioned 
Valentine after receiving the tip, the officers were not 
permitted to frisk him, even though they encountered him 
late at night in a high-crime area known for shootings, and 
even though, unlike Terry, the officers had specific, reliable 
reasons for believing that he was armed. We do not think 
the Supreme Court's jurisprudence supports such a result. 
 
As the Supreme Court noted in a case much like ours, an 
officer has "ample reason to fear for his safety" while 
investigating a person reported to have a concealed weapon 
at 2:15 in the morning in a high-crime ar ea. Adams v. 
Williams, 407 U.S. at 147-48, 92 S.Ct. at 1924. See also 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 23-24, 88 S.Ct. at 1881 ("[E]very year in 
this country many law enforcement officers ar e killed in the 
line of duty, and thousands more are wounded. Virtually all 
of these deaths and a substantial portion of the injuries are 
inflicted with guns and knives."). 
 
In evaluating the totality of the circumstances, we must 
also take into account that Valentine and the two men with 
him immediately began walking away from the patrol car 
when it arrived. Walking away from the police hardly 
amounts to the headlong flight considered in Wardlaw and 
of course would not give rise to reasonable suspicion by 
itself, even in a high-crime area, but it is a factor that can 
be considered in the totality of the cir cumstances. As the 
Supreme Court recently said, "nervous, evasive behavior is 
a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion." 
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Wardlaw, 528 U.S. at ___, 120 S.Ct. at 676. See also United 
States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 8-9, 109 S.Ct. at 1585-86; 
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885, 95 S.Ct. 
2574 (1975); Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 6, 105 S.Ct. 
308, 311 (1984) (per curiam). As the First Cir cuit recently 
stated in the context of a search of a taxi,"slouching, 
crouching, or any other arguably evasive movement, when 
combined with other factors particular to the defendant or 
his vehicle, can add up to reasonable suspicion." United 
States v. Woodrum, 202 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2000) (citing 
United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 n.3, 105 S.Ct. 
1568, 1573 n.3 (1985); United States v. Aldaco , 168 F.3d 
148, 152 (5th Cir. 1999)). See also United States v. Brown, 
159 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 
In summary, we conclude that the officers had 
reasonable suspicion after they received the face-to-face tip, 
were in a high-crime area at 1:00 a.m., and saw Valentine 
and his two companions walk away as soon as they noticed 
the police car. 
 
The government offers another gr ounds for distinguishing 
this case from Ubiles. Unlike the V irgin Islands, New Jersey 
not only makes it a crime when a person "knowingly has in 
his possession any handgun, including any antique 
handgun, without first having obtained a per mit to carry 
the same," N.J.S.A. S 2C:39-5(b), but also New Jersey 
presumes that someone carrying a handgun does not have 
a permit to possess it until the person establishes 
otherwise. See N.J.S.A. S 2C:39-2(b). New Jersey also has 
strict permit requirements and a rigid investigation and 
approval process that buttress the statutory presumption. 
See N.J.S.A. S 2C:58-4. 
 
Given the evidence supporting the informant's tip in this 
case, we need not consider New Jersey's regulatory scheme 
or determine under what circumstances New Jersey's 
presumption would provide reasonable suspicion for a 
Terry stop. 
 
IV 
 
The District Court expressly held that inquiry about 
reasonable suspicion in this case should be confined to 
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events before Woodard order ed Valentine to stop. Because 
the District Court reached this issue, we think it is 
important to explain why that holding was err oneous. 
 
While it is true that the "reasonableness of official 
suspicion must be measured by what the officers knew 
before they conducted their search," J.L., 529 U.S. at ___, 
120 S.Ct. at 1379, the District Court's analysis did not take 
into account that there can be no Fourth Amendment 
violation until a seizure occurs. In Hodari D. the Supreme 
Court held that for there to be a seizur e, the police must 
apply physical force to the person being seized or, where 
force is absent, have the person seized submit to a show of 
police authority. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626-28, 111 S.Ct. 
at 1550-51; Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279, 291 (3d Cir. 
1999); United States v. Bradley, 196 F .3d 762, 768 (7th Cir. 
1999). Thus, if the police make a show of authority and the 
suspect does not submit, there is no seizur e. Hodari D., 
499 U.S. at 626, 111 S.Ct. at 1551; United States v. 
$32,400 in United States Currency, 82 F .3d 135, 139 (7th 
Cir. 1992). As the Supreme Court r ecently explained, 
"Attempted seizures of a person are beyond the scope of the 
Fourth Amendment." County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 
U.S. 833, 845 n.7, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 1716 n.7 (1998). Cf. 
Brower v. Inyo County, 489 U.S. 593, 596-97, 109 S.Ct. 
1378, 1381 (1989) (A seizure did not occur during the 20 
miles in which a police car, with flashing lights, chased a 
suspect, and instead only occurred when the suspect's car 
crashed into a police blockade.). 
 
The facts of Hodari D. illustrate how the concept of a 
seizure should be applied. When two police officers 
approached a group of four or five youths gathered around 
a car, the group immediately dispersed, prompting one 
officer to pursue Hodari, the respondent. By taking a side 
street, the officer was able to overtake Hodari. Surprised, 
Hodari tossed away what appeared to be a small rock, 
moments before the officer tackled him. The central 
question before the Supreme Court was whether the small 
rock, which turned out to be crack, should be suppressed. 
 
The Court held that even assuming that the officers did 
not have reasonable suspicion to stop Hodari when the 
pursuit began, the crack should not have been suppr essed, 
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for Hodari never complied with the police officers' original 
show of authority and therefore was not seized when he 
threw the crack aside. 
 
Other courts have applied Hodari D. and considered a 
suspect's conduct after he failed to comply with an officer's 
show of authority. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 212 
F.3d 1313 (D.C. Cir. 2000); United States v. Smith, 217 F.3d 
746 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Santamaria- 
Hernandez, 968 F.2d 980 (9th Cir . 1992). 
 
In Johnson, for example, two officers in an unmarked car 
were patrolling a high-crime area and pulled into a parking 
lot where two people were sitting in a parked car with a 
young woman standing nearby. As the officers appr oached, 
they saw the woman lean into the passenger's window and 
hand the defendant, Johnson, an object. As the officers 
drew closer, the woman walked away, and Johnson made 
what the officers described as a "shoving down" motion. 
Thinking Johnson might be armed, one officer drew his 
gun, advised his partner to do the same, and shouted, "Let 
me see your hands." 212 F.3d at 1315. But Johnson did 
not comply and continued to shove down with his ar ms 
several more times. In response, the officer quickly strode 
up to the car, reached in, and discover ed crack. 
 
The D.C. Circuit reasoned that if the seizure had taken 
place when the officers drew their guns and ordered 
Johnson to show his hands, the court "doubt[ed] very 
much" whether the officers would have had r easonable 
suspicion to make a stop. Id. at 1316. Johnson did not 
comply, however, with the officers' show of authority. "On 
the contrary, he continued to make `shoving down' motions, 
gestures that were the very opposite of complying with 
Fulton's order, and which a reasonable officer could have 
thought were actually suggestive of hiding (or retrieving) a 
gun." Id. at 1316-17. Those actions, the court held, gave 
the officers reasonable suspicion for the search that 
revealed the crack. Cf. Watkins v. City of Southfield, 221 
F.3d 883 (6th Cir. 2000) (A suspect's refusal to comply with 
an officer's order to stop contributed to the officer's 
suspicion.); United States v. Moorefield, 111 F.3d 10, 14 (3d 
Cir. 1997) (When officers stopped the defendant's car, his 
"furtive hand movements and refusal to obey the officers' 
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orders" helped provide the officers with reasonable 
suspicion.). 
 
We conclude that as in Johnson and Moorefield, what 
Valentine did after he failed to comply with the police 
officers' orders can be considered in evaluating reasonable 
suspicion. Valentine hopes to distinguish cases like 
Johnson and Smith by claiming that in fact he had already 
been seized before he charged towar d Officer Woodard. He 
says that when Woodard order ed him to come over and 
place his hands on the car, he momentarily"complied" with 
the order, stopped, and gave his name. This "compliance," 
he protests, was enough to trigger a seizur e. 
 
We have reviewed the record carefully and find no 
evidence in support of Valentine's theory that he even 
momentarily complied, and some evidence, such as 
Woodard's police report, appears to rebut the theory. But 
regardless, no factual determination is necessary, for even 
if we accept Valentine's version, it would not show that he 
was seized before he charged Woodard. 
 
Under some circumstances we have held that a 
defendant was seized despite his subsequent flight. In 
United States v. Coggins, 986 F.2d 651, 653-54 (3d Cir. 
1993) police officers stopped the defendant in a stairwell at 
an airport and asked him a number of questions, which he 
answered. After the defendant later asked per mission to go 
to the bathroom and was allowed to leave, hefled. On 
appeal we rejected the government's ar gument that the 
defendant had not been seized. 
 
But Valentine's case is easily distinguishable, for his 
momentary "compliance" is a far cry fr om the lengthy 
detention in Coggins. Cf. United States v. Hernandez, 27 
F.3d 1403, 1407 (9th Cir. 1994) (The defendant's 
momentary hesitation and direct eye contact with officer 
prior to his flight did not constitute a seizur e.); United 
States v. Sealey, 30 F.3d 7, 10 (1st Cir . 1994) (A defendant 
was not seized when an officer approached him and called 
out, "Hey Stephen, what's up?"); United States v. 
Washington, 12 F.3d 1128, 1132 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (The 
defendant was not seized when he stopped his car at the 
curb in response to police commands, but then sped away 
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when the officer approached on foot.). Even if Valentine 
paused for a few moments and gave his name, he did not 
submit in any realistic sense to the officers' show of 
authority, and therefore there was no seizure until Officer 
Woodard grabbed him. 
 
And once we consider Valentine's actions after Woodard's 
order, it is clear that we have an independent ground for 
finding that the officers had reasonable suspicion. For if 
headlong flight in a high-crime area pr ovides reasonable 
suspicion under Wardlaw, then charging toward a police 
officer in a high-crime area also by itself provides 
reasonable suspicion. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the District Court's order of 
April 27, 2000, will be reversed. The case will be remanded 
to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
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       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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